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NOTES
FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY APPLIED TO THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY
An individual's right of privacy and the freedom of the press have
been in conflict since Samuel Warren, annoyed by constant press coverage
of his wife's social affairs,' first proposed the right of privacy. 2 Believing
that the press was "overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and decency," Warren and his former law associate Louis Bran-
deis argued for recognition of the right of an individual to be left alone.
As articulated by Warren and Brandeis, the right of privacy serves to
protect the private details of a person's life from the relentless eye of the
press. Since that time, the right of privacy has expanded beyond this origi-
nal conception. Today, the tort broadly characterized as invasion of privacy
has four analytically distinct caterries: 4 (I) unreasonable publicity given to
the private details of a person's life (disclosure); 5 (2) publicity unreasonably
placing a person in a false light before the public (false light); 9 (3) un-
reasonable intrusion upon a person's seclusion (intrusion);' and (4) appro-
priation of a person's name or likeness (appropriation). 5 These four
categories are related only in their concern for an individual's right to lead
a private life. 9 As the Restatement (Second) of Torts observes, however,
even "this nexus becomes quite tenuous in the case of the appropriation of
name or likeness ..., which appears rather to confer something analogous
' Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960).
2 Warren & Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 MARV. L. REV, 193 (1890).
Id, at 196.
See generally, W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToR'rs §§ 652A-652E (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976).
" See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (see text at notes 16-20
infra); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) (publication in a movie of incidents
in the past life of a reformed prostitute along with her true name held to be actionable). But
cf. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940) (publication
of a magazine article which described plaintiff as a person who had been a child prodigy and
who had later sought to conceal his true identity held not to be actionable).
"See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (see text at notes 12-15 and 97-102
infra); Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.V.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877
(1966), vacated and remanded per curiam, 387 U.S. 239, alp, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840,
286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967) (publication of fictitious biography of well known baseball player
held actionable).
See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (reporters held to
have invaded plaintiff's privacy when they gained admittance to his home by subterfuge and
photographed him withOut his consent); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 259
(1964) (landlord held to have invaded tenants privacy when he installed a listening device in
his bedroom).
"See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (publi-
cation of the picture of plaintiff, without his consent, as part of an advertisement promoting
the publisher's business, held actionable invasion of' privacy); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953) (baseball
players held to have right to control the use of their pictures on baseball cards).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 652A, Comment b. Dean Prosser in explaining the
differing interests protected by these four categories states:
Taking them in order--intrusion, disclosure, false light, and appropriation—the
first and second require the invasion of something secret, secluded or private
pertaining to the plaintiff; the third and fourth do not. The second and third
depend upon publicity, while the first does not, nor does the fourth, although it
usually involves it. The third requires falsity or fiction; the other three do not.
PRossER,supra note 4, § 117 at 814.
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to a property right upon the individual. "t 0 Some courts and commentators
have referred to this property interest as the "right of publicity.""
The Supreme Court has considered the conflict between the freedom
of the press and the right of privacy in only two of its four categories. In
Time, Inc. v. Hill,' the Court discussed the false light category. The plain-
tiff in Hill sued for an invasion of privacy resulting from the defendant's
publication of a magazine article which depicted him in a false light. 13 Ap-
plying the same standard of liability which it had developed in the New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan line of defamation cases," the Supreme Court held
'° RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A, Comment b. See also id. at § 652C, Com-
ment a.
" The suggestion has been made by several legal commentators that a conceptual dis-
tinction should be made between the "right of publicity" (injury to property interest) and the
much broader branch of privacy known as "appropriation of name or likeness" (injury to feel-
ings). Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality, and History, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 553
(1960); Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEND'. PROB. 203 (1954); Pember & Tee-
ter, Privacy and the Press Since Time, Inc. v. Hill, 50 WASH. L. REV. 57 (1975); Note, The Right of
Publicity—Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527 (1976). The first
case to distinguish adequately between the two interests involved was Haelan Laboratories,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868-69 . (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816
(1953). Since that case, several other jurisdictions have recognized the right of publicity, either
as being encompassed by the "appropriation" branch of privacy or as a separate tort. See, e.g.,
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (recognizing right of pub-
licity as a separate tort distinct from right of privacy); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp.
1277 (D. Minn. 1970) (seemingly recognizing the right of publicity as a separate tort); Canessa
v. J. I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J. Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62 (1967) (recognizing right of publicity as
constituting a branch of the right of privacy).
New York has a statute which provides a cause of action when an individual's name or
likeness is commercially appropriated. N.Y. Civ, Riders LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1998). The
New York courts have strictly limited this statute as providing redress only for injury to feel-
ings, and have not recognized a right of publicity as arising under the statute. Gautier v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 278 App. Div. 431, 438, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553, 560 (1951), affd, 304 N.Y. 354, 107
N•E.2d 485 (1952); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 450, 299 N.Y.S.2d
501, 508 (1968). New York's failure to recognize the right of publicity may have significantly
retarded the growth of this tort. See Note, The Right of Publicity—Protection for Public Figures and
Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527, 532 (1976). Recently, however, New York decisions have
evidenced a willingness to recognize the right of publicity either independently of the statute,
or as being encompassed by the statute's terms. See Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach,
Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Sys-
tems, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144, affd as modified, 42 App. Div. 2c1 544, 345
N•Y.S.2d 17 (1973). However, no Court of Appeals decision has yet embraced the right of
publicity as arising independent of the privacy statute.
12 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
"Id, at 377. Defendant Life Magazine published an account of a play and falsely de-
scribed it as a re-enactment of an incident in plaintiff's life.
" 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that before a newspaper
may be held liable to a "public official" for publication of defamatory falsehoods, the plaintiff
must prove that the defamatory statement was published with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless di;regard of truth or falsity. Id. at 279.80. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967), the Court extended the application of the Sullivan standard to "public fig-
ures." Id. at 155. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), the application of
the Sullivan standard was further extended to apply to "private individuals" as long as the de-
famatory statements concerned matters of general or public interest. Id. at 52. However, in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court overruled Rosenbloom
and held that so long as the states did not impose liability without fault, they could choose for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for the protection of "private individuals." Id.
at 346-48. Recently, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Court reaffirmed its
holding in Gertz. Id. at 457.
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that the first amendment shields the press from liability for publication of
nondelamatory falsehoods unless the publication is made with knowledge
of its falsity or in reckless disregard of its truth."
The Court discussed the relationship between the first amendment
and the disclosure category of privacy in Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn."
There, the plaintiff brought suit against a newspaper which' had published
the name of his daughter, a rape victim." The newspaper had obtained
her name from public court records.' 8 Avoiding the broader question
whether "the State may ever define and protect an area of privacy free
from unwanted publicity in the press,"" the Court narrowly held that the
first amendment precludes media liability for truthful publication of in-
formation available from official court records. 2 °
Last Term, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Go.," the Su-
preme Court considered for the first time the relationship between the ap-
propriation category of the right of privacy and the first amendment."
The Court held that the first amendment does not privilege the news
media to televise a performer's entire act against his express objection." In
so doing, the Court considered the right of publicity to be analytically
distinct for constitutional purposes from other branches of the right of pri-
vacy. 24 However, by narrowly limiting its decision to a rather unusual fact
situation, the Court did not articulate a broad test for first amendment
privilege in this category of privacy, as it had done for the false light cate-
gory in Hill. This note will examine the basis of the result in Zucchini and
the distinctions which the Court drew between the right of publicity and
other branches of the right of privacy. In this light, the note will then seek
to determine what test the Court is likely Co require in the future to re-
concile this aspect of an individual's right of privacy and the first amend-
ment.
' 5 385 U.S. at 388.
'a 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
"!d. at 474.
' 8 Id. at 472.73.
' 5 Id. at 491.
sa Id. fiy deciding the case on such narrow grounds, the Supreme Court left open the
possibility that the rim amendment does not preclude liability for the truthful publication of
private details. indeed, although the Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, several other
courts have taken the position that under certain circumstances the media may he liable for
truthful publication of private details. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 988, on remand, 424 F. Supp. 1286 (1976); Briscoe v. Reader's Di-
gest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Ca1.3d 529, 540, 483 1 3 .2d 34, 42, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 874 (1971). The court
of appeals in Virgil ruled that unless the private facts were privileged or newsworthy, the pub-
lication of private facts is not protected by the first amendment. The court adopted the stan-
dard suggested by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975), that
liability may be imposed for an invasion of privacy stemming from the disclosure of
embarrassing private facts only if' the matter is not a legitimate, newsworthy concern of the
public. 527 F.2d at 1129:
21 — U.S.—, 97 S. Ct. 2849 (1977).
22 The Supreme Court has not yet been faced with a case posing first amendment issues
with respect to the remaining branch of privacy, "unreasonable intrusion upon a person's se-
clusion." For an excellent discussion of the nature of these first amendment issues, see
Dietemann v. lime, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
" 97 S. Ct. at 2857, 2859.
24 Id. at 2855-56.
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I. THE ZACCHINI DECISION
In 1972, The Great Zacchini was performing his human cannonball
act at the Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio." Lasting approximately
fifteen seconds, Zacchini's act consisted of his being shot from a cannon
into a net located two hundred feet away." Ignoring Zacchini's express re-
quest that he not film the act, a reporter from a local television station vid-
eotaped an entire performance." The station then broadcast this fifteen
second film clip on its eleven o'clock news program, commenting favorably
upon the performance."
Following this broadcast, Zacchini brought suit in the Ohio Court of
Common Pleas against Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company, the
operator of the television station." He alleged that Scripps-Howard un-
lawfully had appropriated his professional property by broadcasting his act
without consent, 3° and requested damages of twenty-five thousand dol-
Iars. 3 ' After the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, Zacchini sought review by the Ohio Court of Appeals." The ap-
pellate court reversed the trial court's judgment, 33 holding that the first
amendment does not privilege the media to appropriate a performer's en-
tire act without his consent. 34
"Id. at 2851,
2" Id. Zacchini's act was staged in an open area surrounded by grandstands, and mem-
bers of the public were not charged a separate admission to watch it. Id.
22 Id.
28
 Id. at 2851 n.l. The script read by the news commentator was very favorable:
This ... now ... is the story of a true spectator sport ... the sport of human
cannonballing ... in fact, the great Zacchini is about the only human cannonball
around, these days ... just happens that, where he is, is the Great Geauga County
Fair, in Burton ... and believe me, although it's not a long act, it's a thriller ...
and you really need to see it in person . . . to appreciate it ..
Id. (emphasis in original).
"Id. at 2851.
"Id. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that "the defendant showed and commercialized the
film of his act without his consent and such conduct by the defendant was unlawful appropria-
tion of plaintiff's professional property." Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at App. p. 49, Zac-
chini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 97 S. Ct. 2849 (1977).
It is important to note that plaintiff did not characterize his cause of action as one for
invasion of privacy, but as one for damage to his professional property, or, as the Ohio Su-
preme Court chose to characterize it, his "right of publicity." Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 231-32, 351 N.E.2d 454, 459 (1976).
" Zacchini did not indicate in his complaint whether the requested damages reflected
the unjust enrichment received by defendant or the harm he suffered by defendant's act. Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court of Ohio did not elucidate what the proper measure of damages
should be in a right of publicity suit. In regard to this issue, the Supreme Court of the United
States was equivocal as to the proper measure of damages. As noted by the dissent:
At some points the Court seems to acknowledge that the reason for recognizing a
cause of action asserting a "right of publicity" is to prevent unjust enrichment.
... But the remainder of the opinion inconsistently accepts a measure of dam-
ages based not on the defendant's enhanced profits but on harm to the plaintiff'
regardless of any gain to the defendant.
97 S. Ct. at 2859 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
"Id. at 2851. No opinion was reported for the court of appeals, but the opinion can be
found in the Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at App, p. 27, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 97 S. Ct. 2849 (1977).
" 97 S. Ct. at 2851.
34 Id. at 2852. The majority held that Zacchini had set forth a valid cause of action
against defendant Scripps-Howard "based either on conversion or the invasion of the per-
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The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals and reinstated the trial court judgment for defendant Scripps-
Howard." Although recognizing that Zacchini had stated a valid cause of
action for invasion of his right of publicity," the court nevertheless rea-
soned that the news media must be given broad latitude in their de-
termination as to how much of a particular story to present." Relying prin-
cipally on the United States Supreme Court's decisions in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan 38 and Time, Inc. v. Hill," the court held that the defendant
was privileged to show Zacchini's act on its newscast. 40
former's common law copyright." A concurring judge stated that plaintiffs cause of action was
for invasion of his property interest in controlling the publicity given to his act, an interest
which the concurring judge labelled the "right of publicity." Although differing as to the ap-
propriate denomination of plaintiffs claim, both Ohio Court of Appeals opinions agreed that
the first amendment did not privilege the defendant to show Zacchini's act without his con-
sent. Zacchini, 97 S. Ct. at 2852.
" Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 235-36, 351
N.E.2d 454, 462 (1976).
" Id. at 231-32, 351 N.E.2d at 459. The Ohio Supreme Court first recognized a cause
of action for invasion of privacy in Housh v. Path, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E,2d 340 (1956),
where it held that:
An actionable invasion of the right of privacy is the unwarranted appropriation or
exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with which
the public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's private
activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humilia-
tion to a person of ordinary sensibilities.
Id. at 35, 133 N.E.2d at 341 (emphasis added), As the language in Housh indicates, the right
recognized in that case was directed primarily at redressing injury to feelings. In Zacchini, the
Ohio Supreme Court recognized for the first time the right of publicity. The court was not
concerned with redressing injury to feelings, but with protecting the property interest which a
performer has in controlling the publicity given to his act. However, the court did not deal
with the right of publicity as a tort separate from the right of privacy, but as being encom-
passed by the branch of privacy known as "appropriation of name or likeness." 47 Ohio St. 2d
at 224, 351 N.E.2d at 455. The court reconciled the apparent inconsistency of allowing a per-
former to recover for damage to his right of publicity under the general rubric of the right of
privacy by noting that
the "privacy" which the performer seeks is personal control over commercial dis-
play and exploitation of his personality and the exercise of his talents. In other
words, performers and other public figures wish to keep the benefits of their
performances private, or at least retain control over them, in much the same way
that any individual would wish to keep control over his name and face.
Id. at 231, 351 N.E.2d at 459.
37 47 Ohio St. 2d at 235, 351 N.E.2d at 461.
38 376 U.S. 254 (1964):
3" 385 U.S. 374 (1967). The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the net effect of
Sullivan and Hill was that "the press has a privilege to report matters of legitimate public in-
terest even though such reports might intrude on matters otherwise private." 47 Ohio St. 2d
at 234, 351 N.E.2d at 461.
'° 47 Ohio St. 2d at 235-36, 351 N.E.2d 'at 462. In reaching its decision, the Supreme
Court of Ohio reasoned that the application of a fixed standard which prevented the press
from reporting an entire performance would unduly inhibit the freedom of the press. Id. at
235, 351 N.E.2d at 461. The court concluded that the
proper standard must necessarily be whether the matters reported were of public
interest, and if so, the press will be liable for appropriation of a performer's right
of publicity only if its actual intent was not to report the performance, but,
rather, to appropriate the performance for some other private use, or if the ac-
tual intent was to injure the performer.
Id. Applying this standard to the instant case, the court determined that the defendant had
not abused its privilege. Id. at 235-36, 351 N.E,2d at 462.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,'" and, in a five
to four decision,'" reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohi0. 43
In an opinion written by Justice White, the Court held that the first
amendment does not privilege the media to broadcast a performer's entire
act without his consent, 44 at least when they have actual knowledge that the
performer expressly objects to such a broadcast. 45
In reaching its decision, the Court first distinguished the case at hand
from its decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill" recognizing a first amendment
privilege in the area of false light privacy. The Zacchini Court drew two
distinctions between false light privacy and the right of publicity. First, the
Court perceived a different state interest in providing a cause of action for
false light privacy than for the right of publicity. While the state interest in
redressing false light invasion of privacy is to protect against injury to re-
putation and feelings, the state interest underlying the right of publicity is
to safeguard a performer's proprietary interest in his act, in part to en-
courage such performances for the public benefit.'" Second, the Court
reasoned that false light privacy and the right of publicity differ in the de-
gree to which their protection inhibits dissemination of information to the
public." In false light privacy, the Court observed, the individual can be
protected only by minimizing the spread of false information." In contrast,
where the right of publicity is protected, the dissemination of information
is not curtailed; the only issue is which party has the right to do the dis-
seminating. 5 ° The Court noted that entertainers usually have no objection
to the broadcast of their act as long as they thereby derive the commercial
benefit." Indeed, Zacchini had not sought to enjoin the broadcast of his
The syllabus preceding the Ohio Supreme Court opinion did not indicate whether the
court had based its decision on federal or state grounds. Although the syllabus and not the ac-
companying opinion is the law in Ohio, 01-no REV. CODE ANN. § 2503.20 (Baldwin 1964), the
opinion may be referred to in order to elucidate the reasoning behind the syllabus. See, e.g.,
Hart v. Andrews, 103 Ohio St. 218, 221, 132 N.E. 846, 847 (1921). In Zacchini, the Ohio Su-
preme Court opinion appeared to be based solely on federal grounds, since the court relied
solely on United States Supreme Court decisions construing the first amendment. Moreover,
the Ohio Supreme Court did not cite any state decisions, nor did it mention the Ohio con-
stitution.
" —U.S,—, 97 S. Ct. 730 (1977).
" Justice White was joined in his majority opinion by Chief justice Burger, and Justices
Rehnquist, Blackmun and Stewart. Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined. Justice Stevens dissented separately on the ground that the
Court should not have reached the merits because it was doubtful that there was even a fed-
eral question.
43 97 S. Ct. at 2859. Before reaching the first amendment issue, the Court first deter-
mined that it had jurisdiction to hear the case since the Supreme Court of Ohio opinion did
not rest on an independent and adequate state ground. The majority reasoned that the opin-
ion either rested solely on the first amendment, or that, at the very least, the Supreme Court
of Ohio "felt compelled by what it understood to be federal constitutional considerations to
construe and apply its own law in the manner it did." Id. at 2853. On either basis, the majority
concluded, there was no independent and adequate state ground. Id. at 2853-54.
14 /d. at 2857.
" Id. at 2859.
46 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
43 97 S. Ct. at 2856.
1d.
" Id.
so id. .
"Id.
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act, but only to receive compensation in the form of damages." Since the
Court determined that the right of publicity is distinct from the tort of
false light privacy, it concluded that its decision in Hill did not mandate a
first amendment privilege to infringe a performer's right of publicity."
After distinguishing Hill from the case at hand, the Court also in-
dicated that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 54 and its progeny," which had
established a first amendment privilege in defamation law, did not support
a similar privilege in the right of publicity context. 56 None of these cases
had involved an appropriation by the media of a performer's right of pub-
licity. 57 Moreover, the Court pointed out, both the Sullivan line of defama-
tion cases and Hill had involved only the reporting of the details of an
event, not the broadcast of a performer's entire act. 59 The Court concluded
that defendant Scripps-Howard clearly would have been privileged under
the first amendment had it limited the report to only the newsworthy de-
tails of Zacchini's performance."
Convinced that its previous decisions in defamation and false light
privacy did not mandate a media privilege to televise an entertainer's entire
act, the Court proceeded to examine the two state interests which underlie
the right of publicity. 6 ° First, the Court noted that a state has an interest in
protecting the economic value of a performer's act."' In this connection,
the Court observed that Zacchini presented "what may be the strongest case
for a 'right of publicity'—involving not the appropriation of an enter-
tainer's reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product,
but the appropriation . of the very activity by which the entertainer acquired
his reputation in the first place."" 2 Second, a state has an interest in en-
couraging entertainers to produce acts of interest to the public. 63 Analogiz-
ing these two state interests to the policies underlying the patent and
copyright laws, 64 the Court likened the broadcast of Zacchini's act to the
unlicensed broadcast of a copyrighted dramatic work," a prize fight," or a
baseball game." The Court concluded that "[w]herever the line ... is to be
drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we
are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize
the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his con-
sent."" In reaching this decision, the Court was careful to note that its
"Id.
53
 Id. at 2855.
54 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
55 See note 14 supra.
" 97 S. Ct. at 2856.
37 Id.
38 hI.
36 Id.
"Id. at 2857.
61 Id.
"Id.
63 1d.
"Id.
Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911); Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317
(1920).
" Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 926 (1956).
67 Pittsburg Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
" 97 S. Ct. at 2856-57.
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holding did not amount to imposing strict liability on the defendant be-
cause Scripps-Howard had known that Zacchini expressly objected to the
broadcast of his act." Moreover, the Court observed that while the first
amendment does not require a privilege in this context, a state is free to
create such a privilege under its own law."
Joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Powell
criticized the majority opinion as insensitive to the first amendment in-
terests at stake." The dissent found the fact that Zacchini's act was shown
on a news program rather than on a commercial broadcast determinative
of the first amendment issue," reasoning that Zacchini could not complain
if his performance was the subject of routine news coverage once he had
decided to make his act interesting to the public. 73 The dissent also warned
that the Court's holding might result in media self-censorship:
Hereafter, whenever a television news editor is unsure whether
certain film footage received from a camera crew might be held
to portray an "entire act," he may decline coverage—even of
clearly newsworthy events—or confine the broadcast to
watered-down verbal reporting, perhaps with an occasional still
picture .... This is hardly the kind of news reportage that the
First Amendment is meant to foster. 74
Accordingly, the dissent concluded that Scripps-Howard was privileged to
use the film of plaintiffs act as part of a routine news program, "absent a
strong showing by the plaintiff that the news broadcast was a subterfuge or
cover for private or commercial exploitation." 75
The Court in Zacchini narrowly limited. its decision to the facts of the
case before it. As a result, the only concrete constitutional principle to
emerge from the Court's opinion is that the first amendment does not pre-
clude liability when the news media both appropriate a performer's entire
act and know of the performer's objection to that appropriation. By tailor-
ing its decision narrowly, the Supreme Court left unresolved two issues
concerning the limits which the first amendment places upon state protec-
"Id. at 2859.
"Id.
71 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
"Id.
"Id. at 2860.
"Id. at 2859-60.
"Id. at 2860. Justice Powell doubted that the majority's holding provided a standard
clear enough to decide even the case at hand. He noted that:
Although the record is not explicit, it is unlikely that the "act" commenced ab-
ruptly with the explosion that launched petitioner on his way, ending with the
landing in the net a few seconds later. One may assume that the actual firing was
preceded by some fanfare, possibly stretching over several minutes, to heighten
the audience's anticipation: introduction of the performer, description of the
uniqueness and danger. last-minute checking of the apparatus, and entry into the
cannon, all accompanied by suitably ominous commentary from the master of
ceremonies. If this is found to be the case on remand, then respondent could not
be said to have appropriated the "entire act" in its 15-second newsclipand the
Court's opinion then would afford no guidance for resolution of the case.
Moreover, in future cases involving different performances, similar difficulties in
determining just what constitutes the "entire act" are inevitable.
Id. at 2859 n.l.
284
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
tion of the right of publicity. The first issue concerns the appropriate stan-
dard of liability when the news media broadcast a performer's act and are
not aware that he objects to such a broadcast. The second issue concerns
the circumstances under which the news media may be held liable for ap-
propriation of something less than an entire performance. The resolution
of these issues is of practical importance to the news media in order that
they may gauge their !potential liability for broadcasting a performer's act."
II. POTENTIAL MEDIA LIABILITY FOR INFRINGING A PERFORMER'S RIGHT
OF PUBLICITY
The narrow, ad hoc resolution of the issues in Zacchini contrasts with
the approach which the Court previously has employed to resolve first
amendment issues in defamation" and false light privacy" cases. In these
fields, the Court has formulated broad constitutional rules by balancing the
first amendment interest in preserving a free press against the state interest
in protecting reputation." Once formulated, such rules can be employed to
decide later cases without the necessity of reweighing the competing in-
terests in each new case. In discussing the merits of this constitutional
rulemaking approach, the Court has stated:
Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs of the
press and the individual's claim to compensation for wrongful in-
jury might be struck on a case-by-case basis.... But this ap-
proach would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expec-
tations, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower
courts unmanageable. Because an ad hoc resolution of the com-
peting interests at stake in each particular case is not feasible, we
must lay down broad rules of general application."°
One commentator has labelled this constitutional rulemaking "definitional
balancing."" After examining how the Court has used definitional balanc-
ing to resolve first amendment issues in defamation and false light privacy
cases, this note will explore the possible application of definitional balanc-
ing to right of publicity cases.
A. Definitional Balancing in Defamation and False Light Privacy
The Supreme Court first employed definitional balancing in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan." The plaintiff in Sullivan was a public official who
7 " The remainder of this note will be concerned with media liability for news use of a
performer's act. Commercial use of a performer's act by the media would present different con-
siderations.
77 See note 14 supra.
78
 See text at notes 12-15 supra.
79 See Nimmer, The Right to Speak .
 from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to
Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALM L. REv, 935, 942 (1968) thereinafter cited as Nimmerl.
"Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
" Nimmer, supra note 79, at 942.
" 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Although the opinion in Sullivan does not acknowledge ex-
pressly that the standard defined there was the result of balancing, this fact has been made
clear by subsequent opinions. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974);
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 63 (1971) (Harlan, ,J., dissenting); Curtis Pub.
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, CI, concurring).
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brought suit against the defendant newspaper for publishing an advertise-
ment which defamed him. 83 In considering the first amendment interests at
issue in Sullivan, the Supreme Court rejected any rule which would require
a newspaper to guarantee the truth of its assertions regarding a public offi-
cial." Such a rule would constitute strict liability and would deter newspa-
pers from voicing their criticism of public officials." In order to protect the
first amendment interest in preserving a vigorous and uninhibited press,
the Court reasoned that some falsehood must be tolerated." At the same
time, however, the Court recognized a legitimate state interest in protecting
an individual's reputation." The Court reconciled this state interest with
the first amendment interest in maintaining a free press by developing a
constitutional rule which requires a public official to prove that a de-
famatory statement relating to his official conduct was made with "knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.""
The Supreme Court later extended the Sullivan rule to apply to pub-
lic figures as well as public officials."" However, in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.," the Court was faced with a media defamation of a private individual
rather than a public figure or public official,"' and used definitional balanc-
ing to arrive at a standard different from that in Sullivan." As in Sullivan,
the competing interests at stake were the need for a robust press and the
state interest in protecting reputation. 93 In Gertz, however, the Court found
the state interest in protecting the reputation of private individuals to be
stronger than the state interest in protecting the reputation of public per-
sons." As a result, the Court concluded that the first amendment does not
require a knowledge or reckless disregard standard of liability for media
defamation of a private individual, at least where "the substance of the de-
famatory statement makes substantial danger to reputation apparent."" In-
stead, the Court held that as long as the states do not impose strict liabil-
ity, they may decide for themselves the appropriate standard of liability
93 376 U.S. at 256-57.
"4 1d. at 279.
93 Id.
99 ld. at 271-72.
" 1 Id. at 256.
"H Id. at 279-80.
" 9 Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
" 418 U.S. 332 (1974).
9' Id. at 326.
92 Id. at 347-48.
" Id. at 343.
94 Id. at 344-45. The Court distinguished in two ways the state interest in a private in-
dividual's reputation from the analogous interest in a public person's reputation. First, the
Court noted that public persons "enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective
communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements
than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to
injury, and the State interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater." Id. Second, the
Court found persuasive the fact that the media are entitled to act on the assumption that pub-
lic persons have voluntarily exposed themselves to the risk of injury from defamation, but that
no such assumption is justified with regard to private individuals. Id. Thus, the Court con-
cluded, "private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and
public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery." id. at 345.
98 Id. at 347-48.
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when the media defames a private individual." After Gertz, then, a state
can choose to employ a negligence standard when the media defames a
private individual rather than the more rigorous reckless disregard stan-
dard required when the media defames a public person.
In Time, Inc. v. Hi 	 the Supreme Court introduced definitional
balancing to the conflict between the freedom of the press and the right of
privacy. The plaintiff in Hill brought suit against the defendant magazine
for publishing an article which depicted him in a false light." The Su-
preme Court held that the Sullivan standard of knowledge or reckless
disregard for falsity is appropriate in false light privacy." The Court in-
dicated that it did not find this standard appropriate through a blind appli-
cation of Sullivan, but rather through a consideration of the competing in-
terests involved in false light privacy.tuo As in Sullivan and Gertz, the Court
was concerned primarily with avoiding media self-censorship. In this light,
the Court concluded that a negligence standard would be inappropriate be-
cause it would require the media to guess as to how a jury might assess the
reasonableness of the steps taken to assure truthful publications.'°'
Moreover, the Court found a negligence standard particularly inappro-
priate when dealing with nondefamatory falsehoods since "the content of
the speech itself affords no warning of prospective harm to another
through falsity." 102
In Zacchini, the Court did not need to develop a broad definitional
standard of liability for media infringement of a performer's right of pub-
licity. Scripps-Howard knew that Zacchini did not consent to the broadcast
of his act.'° 3 Such a condition of actual knowledge clearly satisfies either
the Sullivan reckless disregard standard or the Gertz negligence standard.
Consequently, the Court was not required to define, as in Sullivan, Hill,
and Gertz, a standard less than actual knowledge by which liability could he
imposed on the news media. Nevertheless, if in the future the Court is pre-
sented with a right of publicity case in which the news media were unaware
that a performer objected to the broadcast of his act, it is likely that the
Court will adopt a definitional standard. Such an approach would be con-
sistent with the Court's seeming preference for a definitional rule in cases
involving similar interests.'" Moreover, a definitional standard is more
96 Id.
"385 U.S. 374 (1967).
"Id. at 378-79.
"Id, at 387-88.
'°° Id. at 388-89.
"'Id. at 389.
I" Id.
1 ° 3 97 S. Ct. at 2851.
104 See text at notes 82-102 supra. The Court's decision in Cox Broadcasting Co. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S, 469 (1975) makes it unclear whether the Court favors a definitional balancing
approach in all right of privacy categories. COX raised first amendment. issues in the disclosure
category of the right of privacy, and the Court declined to adopt a broad holding as to first
amendment privilege in this category. Instead the Court limited its decision narrowly to the
facts before it. Id. at 491. See text at notes 16-20 supra.
Although the narrow resolution of first amendment issues in Zucchini might be in-
terpreted as an indication that the Supreme Court does not favor a definitional balancing test
in the appropriation branch of the right of privacy, the Zucchini decision just as easily can be
viewed as an application of the Court's historic reluctance to decide more constitutional law
than necessary. See, e.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960). Indeed this same observa-
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protective of the first amendment concern for press freedom. Such a stan-
dard both warns the news media of their potential liability, and minimizes
the chilling effect of media liability based upon an ad hoc balancing.'° 5
Under a definitional rule, the trier of fact must judge media conduct ac-
cording to a predetermined standard, and, as a result, is less likely to de-
cide upon personal bias as to the role of the press in our society or the
value of the publication at issue."' Thus, it is not only likely that the Court
will use definitional balancing to resolve first amendment issues in right of
publicity cases, but such an approach is also preferable.
B. Definitional Balancing as Applied to the Right of Publicity
In developing the appropriate definitional standard of liability where
the news media broadcast a performer's entire act and are actually unaware
of his objection, the Court will have to balance the first amendment interest
in guarding the freedoms of press and speech against the competing state
interest in protecting an entertainer's proprietary rights. In Zacchini, the
Supreme Court identified two state interests in protecting the right of pub-
licity."' First, a state has an interest in protecting the economic value of a
performer's act. Second, a state has an interest in encouraging entertainers
to produce acts of interest to the public. In comparing these interests with
those underlying the tort of false light privacy, the Court stressed that the
right of publicity protects property rights and not reputation or feelings as
in false light privacy. 108 Although the Court did not explain why this dis-
tinction is significant, implicitly it considers property rights to be more im-
portant than reputational rights. 109
 Consequently, it would appear that the
Supreme Court finds the state interests underlying the right of publicity to
be weightier than the corresponding state interests in false light privacy.
Although the Zacchini Court devoted most of its opinion to a discus-
sion of the state interests in providing a cause of action for the right of
publicity, the Court did evince concern for protecting two first amendment
interests: preserving the free flow of information to the public and main-
taining a robust and uninhibited press. The Court implied that protection
of the right of publicity does not infringe the first amendment interest in
preserving the free flow of information to the public."' The Court noted
that in a right of publicity suit the only issue is which party has the right to
do the broadcasting."' Accordingly, in the Court's view, there is no danger
tion can be made as to the Court's decision in Cox. Therefore, just because the Court has de-
cided two of the most recent privacy cases on narrow grounds does not mean that the Court
has eschewed a definitional balancing approach in the privacy context. Moreover, in another
recent privacy case, Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), the Court in-
dicated that it still considers definitional balancing to be the appropriate test in false light pri-
vacy. Id. at 250.
105 See Nimmer, supra note 79, at 939-42.
100 1d. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339, 346 (1974).
1 ° 7 97 S. Ct. at 2857.
'°s Id. at 2856.
'09
 The Supreme Court has also implied that property interests are more compelling
than reputational interests in the procedural due process context. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
711-12 (1976) (injury to reputation does not result in deprivation of either "liberty" or "prop-
erty" within the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
10 97 S. Ct. at 2856.
1 " Id.
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that the public will be deprived of an opportunity to see the performance
or to learn of it by a press report which does not appropriate the per-
former's act. By contrast, the Court indicated, the tort of false light privacy
necessarily infringes the first amendment interest because an individual's
reputation can be protected only by minimizing the flow of damaging in-
formation." 2 Thus, it would appear that the Supreme Court considers the
first amendment interest in preserving the flow of information to be less
implicated by the right of publicity than false light privacy.
The Court discussed the first amendment interest in maintaining an
uninhibited media only briefly in Zacchini. Because Scripps-Howard knew
that the plaintiff objected to the broadcast of his act, the Court indicated
that a damage recovery by Zacchini would not be based upon strict liability
contrary to the spirit of Gertz.'" It is unlikely, however, that the Supreme
Court would dismiss as summarily the first amendment interest in main-
taining an uninhibited media if it were defining a standard of media liabil-
ity triggered by less than actual knowledge of a performer's objection. To
remain consistent with Sullivan and its progeny, the Court would need to
be more concerned with assuring the press the necessary breathing space to
carry out their constitutionally protected right of reporting the news. In
Sullivan and Gertz, the Court determined that some falsehood must be tol-
erated in order that the press are not deterred unduly in reporting the
truth." 4 Correspondingly, in the right of publicity context, it would seem
that some unconsented uses of a performer's act must be allowed so that
the media continue to inform the public of entertainment events.
The Zucchini Court did not decide whether the requisite breathing
space is accorded the media in the right of publicity context by a negli-
gence standard as in Gertz or by a stricter reckless disregard standard as in
Sullivan. In determining how the Court will resolve this issue, it is signifi-
cant that in Hill the Court deemed a negligence standard particularly in-
appropriate when dealing with nondefamatory falsehoods because "the
content of the [nondefamatory falsehood] itself affords no warning of pro-
spective harm to another through falsity."" 8 Similarly, in Gertz, although
the Court found that a negligence standard of liability for defamation of
private individuals is constitutionally permissible, the Court conditioned the
application of this standard to situations where "the substance of the de-
famatory statement makes substantial danger to reputation apparent.""a
The message of Hill and Gertz is that a negligence standard might not chill
the media unduly if the content of the communication can warn the media
of potential liability. Applying this principle to the right of publicity, the
content of the communication, a paid performer's act, would appear to
provide sufficient warning of a question whether the performer would con-
sent to an appropriation of his act. For example, in Zacchini, both the fact
that the act was performed in a closed environment'" and the fact that the
public was charged an admission fee 18 reasonably should have indicated to
1i2
" 3 Id, at 2859.
1 " Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
'" 385 U.S. at 389,
"6 418 U.S. at 347-48.
"7 97 S. Ct. at 2851.
""Id,
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the defendant that substantial property rights were involved. Because the
form of communication in the appropriation of a performance provides a
warning of potential liability, the Court might find that a negligence stan-
dard does not infringe the first amendment interest in preserving an un-
inhibited media as it does in false light privacy.'"
Since it appears that the Supreme Court, on one hand, considers the
state interest in providing a cause of action to be stronger for the right of
publicity than for false light privacy, and, on the other hand, perceives the
first amendment interest in the free flow of information to be implicated
less by protecting the right of publicity than false light privacy, it would
seem that the constitutional balance favors the state interests in the right of
publicity more than in false light privacy. This balance toward state in-
terests in the right of publicity context is reinforced by the possibility that
the Court might find the first amendment interest in preserving an un-
inhibited media to be infringed less by the right of publicity than false light
privacy. As a result, if the Court is faced with the issue of what standard
less than actual knowledge of objection is constitutionally sufficient to at-
tach liability on the media in a right of publicity suit, it is likely to find that
a negligence standard is appropriate rather than the reckless disregard
standard applied to false light privacy. Under a negligence standard, the
news media would be liable for appropriating a performer's act if they
either knew of his objection or were unreasonable in ascertaining whether
he consented to such a broadcast. 12 °
C. Potential Media Liability for News Use of Less Than an Entire Act
Although it is likely that the Supreme Court would find a negligence
standard as to consent constitutionally appropriate, there remains the sec-
ond issue left open by the Court in Zacchini: does the first amendment
privilege the media against liability for news use of-less than an entire act,
regardless of consent. Although the Zacchini Court did not resolve this is-
'' Some might consider the Sullivan reckless disregard standard applicable to Zacchini
because he was without doubt a public figure, and that therefore the considerations which led
the Court in Gertz to find a negligence standard applicable to private individuals are not pres-
ent in Zacchini. This position, although superficially convincing, is untenable upon close
examination of the Gertz decision. In Gertz, the Supreme Court found a negligence standard
constitutionally permissible for media defamations of private individuals because they are less
able than public figures to use means of communication to correct the harm from defamation.
See note 94 supra. These considerations have no relevance to the right of publicity. For one
thing, there is no such being as a "private" performer. For another, although harm through
defamation can be corrected by additional speech to establish the truth, the same is not true of
harm through appropriation. Once a performer's property rights have been infringed, no
amount of additional speech can correct the harm done. Because different considerations are
present in the right of publicity, the application of a negligence standard as to consent would
not be inconsistent with the Court's decision in Gertz.
120 In this regard, it is noteworthy that the concurring judge for the Ohio Court of Ap-
peals advocated the application of a negligence standard as to consent. In so doing, he ob-
served:
If Mr. Zacchini had performed under circumstances sufficient to justify the photo-
grapher in believing that Zacchini did not abject to the filming, then that reasonable
reliance on the part of the photographer would be sufficient to estop Zacchini
from asserting his claim for appropriation of his right of publicity.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at App. p. 45, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
97 S. Ct. 2849 (1977).
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sue, the Court did define broad parameters as to how much of a per-
former's act the news media can appropriate. On one hand, the Court
suggested that the first amendment privileges the media when they report
merely the newsworthy details of a performance. 12 ' On the other hand, the
Court found that the news media are not privileged when they appropriate
an entire act.' 22
 However, the Court did not develop criteria for drawing
the line between those reports which are privileged as constituting merely a
report of the newsworthy details of a performance, and those which are
unprivileged as appropriating an entire act.'"
Several possible standards are open to the Court in drawing the line
between media reports which are privileged and those which are not. At
one extreme, the Court could adopt its decision in Zacchini as the limit on
media liability, and find that the news media are privileged by the first
amendment to appropriate anything but an entire act. At the other ex-
treme, the Court could decide that the news media are not privileged to
use any part of a performer's act without consent. Such a standard would
limit the media to broadcasting a verbal report of a performance's news-
worthy details. Alternatively, the Court might adopt a standard between
these extremes. One such intermediate standard would privilege the press
to broadcast as much of a performer's act as is newsworthy. Another in-
termediate standard would privilege media appropriations of an enter-
tainer's performance so long as the media do not broadcast a "material or
substantial" part of the performance. The relative merits of these four
standards, and their potential for adoption by the Court will now be
examined.
Despite the Zacchini Court's frequent emphasis on the fact that
Scripps-Howard had broadcast the plaintiffs entire act, it is doubtful that
the Court would adopt a standard privileging the media to appropriate
anything but an entire act. Such a standard is impractical because, as Jus-
tice Powell observed in his dissenting opinion,'" it is often impossible for
the media to determine what constitutes an entire act. At the same time,
such a limit on media liability does not reflect the Zacchini Court's concern
for the state interest in protecting a performer's property rights. The eco-
nomic value of a performer's act may be impaired as readily by media ap-
propriation of only a portion of the act as by appropriation of the entire
act. In addition, by specifically declining to draw the line between media
reports which are privileged and those which are not, the Court implied
that some intermediate standard is constitutionally appropriate. Thus, it is
unlikely that the Court would adopt a standard of liability triggered only by
unconsented use of an entire act.
At the other extreme, the Supreme Court could adopt a standard
which would prohibit the unconsented use of any part of a performer's act.
The Zacchini Court's conclusion that Scripps-Howard would have been
privileged if it had limited its report to just the newsworthy details of Zuc-
chini's performance can be viewed as support for this standard.' 25 A stan-
dard which limits the media to reporting the newsworthy facts of a per-
121
 97 S. Ct, at 2856.
121
 Id. at 2857.
'" Id. at 2856-57.
124 Id. at 2859 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 2854, 2858.
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formance is also consistent with the nature of the right of publicity; a per-
former's right of publicity is infringed when any part of his act is taken
without consent, not just when the entire act is appropriated. Despite these
considerations, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would find such a
standard appropriate. Again, the Court's reluctance in Zucchini to draw the
line between media reports which are privileged and those which are not
implies that some intermediate standard is appropriate. Moreover, it is
likely that the Court would find that a standard which prohibits the un-
consented use of any part of a performer's act impinges too deeply on the
first amendment concern for an open and robust media.
One possible intermediate standard which the Court could adopt
would privilege the news media to broadcast as much of a performer's act
as is newsworthy. Such a standard recognizes that film broadcasts of enter-
tainment events are important news to be protected by the first amend-
ment. In Gertz, however, the Supreme Court discussed the first amendment
implications of a standard similar to a newsworthiness standard.'" In that
case, the Court overruled its holding in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.'"
that the Sullivan reckless disregard standard is applicable to media defama-
tion of private individuals so long as the defamatory statement concerned
"a matter of public or general interest."'" The Court rejected the
Rosenbloom public interest criterion primarily because it failed to give
adequate deference to the legitimate state interest in protecting the reputa-
tion of private individuals. 12 " However, the Court also found the public in-
terest criterion inappropriate because, it would force 'judges to decide on
an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public in-
terest' and which do not The Court was unwilling to commit this
determination to the discretion of judges, presumably because doing so
would lead to media self-censorship. The same considerations which led the
Court to reject a public interest criterion in defamation are relevant to a
discussion of a newsworthiness standard in the right of publicity context. A
newsworthiness standard has the potential of chilling the media because it
is inherently subjective and unprincipled. Such a standard depends for its
content on the individual bias of the trier of fact. 13 ' Moreover, a newswor-
thiness standard is inappropriate because it is essentially incapable of judi-
cial determination. For these reasons, it is unlikely that the Court would
adopt a newsworthiness standard in the right of publicity context.' 32
A second intermediate standard open to the Court would privilege
the news media so long as they do not appropriate a "material or substan-
tial" part of an entertainer's performance. For example, in Zucchini the de-
fendant would have been privileged under a material or substantial stan,
dard to capture a few seconds of Zacchini's act. However, any film broad-
cast which constituted substantially all of Zacchini's act, or which appropri-
I" 418 U.S. at 346.
", 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
' 2 " Id. at 43.
12° 418 U.S. at 346.
' 3° Id.
"'hi. at 339.
in Id. Another factor weighing against the adoption of a newsworthy standard is that
such a standard would overrule Zacchini. Alter all, Zacchini's entire act was arguably newswor-
thy.
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ated a material section of the act, such as the explosion from the cannon,
would be prohibited. This standard balances the competing interests more
adequately than a newsworthiness standard. On one hand, it recognizes
that film reporting of entertainment is important news, and it allows the
media to broadcast some portion of a performer's act to bring to life its
verbal commentary. On the other hand, by recognizing a limit on the
media privilege, a material or substantial standard affords some protection
for the performer's property rights. Moreover, because a material or sub-
stantial standard focuses more on the degree of appropriation than on the
character of what is appropriated, it is more capable of objective de-
termination than is a newsworthiness standard. For these reasons, it is pos-
sible that the Court could find a material or substantial standard constitu-
tionally appropriate.
While it appears likely that the Supreme Court would adopt an in-
termediate standard, the Court in Zacchini gave no real indication as to
where it would draw the line between media reports which are privileged
and those which are not. The Court could adopt any of the standards
discussed above, or possibly even a standard not mentioned. From a media
standpoint, however, it is not so important to know where the Court will
draw the line, as to be aware of where it. might possibly draw the line. The
mere possibility that the Court would adopt•a standard prohibiting all un-
consented news use of a performer's act might be sufficient to deter the
news media from making such unconsented appropriations.
CONCLUSION
In its first pronouncement on the conflict between the freedom of the
press and the right of publicity, the Supreme Court held that the first
amendment does not privilege the news media to broadcast a performer's
entire act, at least when they have actual knowledge of his objection to such
a broadcast. However, by tailoring its decision narrowly to the facts of Zac
chini, the Supreme Court left unresolved two issues of practical importance
to the news media. First, the Court did not define the appropriate stan-
dard of liability when the news media broadcast a performer's act and are
unaware of his objection. In resolving this issue, it is likely that the Court
will find that a negligence standard strikes the appropriate balance between
the first amendment interest in maintaining a free press and the counter-
vailing state interest in protecting a performer's right of publicity. Under
such a negligence standard, the news media would be liable for appropriat-
ing a performer's act if they either acted with knowledge of' his objection
or were unreasonable in ascertaining whether he consented to such a
broadcast. The second issue left unresolved by the Court in Zucchini is
whether the first amendment privileges the news media to broadcast a cer-
tain portion of a performer's act despite his objection. Although the Court
intimated no view as to how it would resolve this issue, there are several
possible standards which the Court could use to define the necessary first
amendment privilege. From a news media standpoint, the most drastic of
these standards would prohibit any unconsented news use of a performer's
act.
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The potential impact of Zacchini on the news media stems more from
an uncertainty as to how the Court will resolve the issues left open, than
from the Court's holding itself. In dealing with the uncertainty created by
Zacchini, the media should not be concerned about appropriating a per-
former's act when they broadcast it on a news program unless the act was
performed for remuneration. When an entertainer performs his act for the
general public, he forfeits any right to control the news coverage given to
his act. For example, a tightrope artist who walks between tops of sky-
scrapers cannot complain when a television station broadcasts his feat as
part of a newscast. Where the media desire to show on the news an act
which is performed for remuneration, they should take the safest course
and ask permission to show the act. If they choose not to ask permission,
the media should be mindful of the issues left open by Zacchini and limit
the report of the act to just the newsworthy details. For, in the final
analysis, Zacchini would appear to stand for the proposition that the first
amendment does not privilege the news media to report for free that for
which the general public must pay.
THOMAS H. HANNIGAN, JR.
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